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Resumen
I use data from a standardized test applied to second and eighth graders
in rural Peru to show that inability to correctly interpret test scores can af-
fect schooling outcomes persistently. Marginally classifying as “remedial” in
second grade math reduces rural males’ eighth grade scores by 0.18 stan-
dard deviations, compared to students that obtained marginally higher sco-
res and were classified as “in transition” in second grade. Since students,
parents, and teachers receive both the score and the label attached to it, this
is evidence of behavioral inattention. Besides being the first study to provide
evidence of behavioral inattention in human capital accumulation in a develo-
ping country setting, this study provides novel evidence on the mechanisms
at play. I show that results owe to classroom environment and household
resource reallocation. Rural males who barely classified as remedial in se-
cond grade are more likely to work, have fewer books available at home,
and perceive a more negative classroom environment by eighth grade than
those who obtained marginally higher scores. These findings have important
implications for educational policy, in particular to the communication of stan-
dardized test scores.
Keywords: Behavioral Inattention, Limited Attention, Human Capital, Edu-
cational Investment, Rural Education
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Behavioral inattention, also known as limited attention or incomplete at-
tention, is a cognitive bias that consists of fixating on certain attributes of a
good or quantity, neglecting the rest at least to a degree. This phenomenon
has been documented in a wide array of settings, from purchases of beer, to
cars, health plans and mortgages, but its consequences have not been fully
explored yet. In this paper, I study the consequences of behavioral attention
to test scores on children’s human capital accumulation. This is a particularly
interesting setting to study behavioral inattention, because children, as well
as their teachers and parents have a wealth of information about the students
abilities and skills besides test scores.
The study setting is Peru, a developing country with an educational sys-
tem that faces challenges common to the developing world. Despite access to
education is broad, learning outcomes are precarious.1 All second and eighth
graders in the country take the Census Student Evaluation (Evaluación Cen-
sal de Estudiantes, in Spanish, or ECE), a standardized test that evaluates
math and language skills. A few months after the test, students and their pa-
rents receive their test score and a label based on their performance, which in
second grade can be “remedial”, “in transition”, or “proficient”. Two students
with essentially identical skills can attain different labels if their scores fall at
different sides of the threshold. Under full attention, observing their scores
would lead to conclude that these students had indeed similar performance.
However, behavioral inattention could lead the students, their parents, tea-
chers or peers, to focus on the label instead of the score; so these students
would be perceived differently just because they received different labels.
Labels have long been studied in sociology and education (Becker, 1963;
Rist, 1977). A small, recent literature estimates empirically their causal effects
on learning outcomes. For instance, Avery et al. (2018) shows that marginally
earning higher integer score in advanced placement exams in a given sub-
ject increases the probability that students choose said subject as a major,
even when the test does not count towards college credit. Smith, Hurwitz,
and Avery (2017) shows that this also increases the likelihood college com-
pletion. Thus, labels can lead to resource misallocation. An important feature
of these studies is that the exact scores were not revealed to the students.
Therefore, in principle, revealing a student’s exact score could make the ef-
1In the 2015 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) evaluation, which evaluated
skills in science, reading, and mathematics, 46% of Peruvian students were ranked as low achie-
vers in its three subjects, and only 0.6% was ranked as top performers in at least one subject.
The OECD averages were 15% (top performers) and 13% (low achievers) (OECD, 2018).
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fects disappear. However, Papay, Murnane, and Willett (2016) shows that
labels may have an effect even when the students and their parents receive
their exact scores in addition to the label, and this is likely due to behavioral
inattention. Using a similar identification strategy as this study, the authors
show that low-income students in Massachussets who marginally earn a po-
sitive label in a low-stakes math test in high school are more likely to attend
college. To my knowledge, this is the only previous evidence on the effects
of inattention to test scores. My study builds on this evidence to provide two
contributions to the literature of empirical behavioral economics: (i) it provides
evidence of inattention to test scores in a developing country context, and (ii)
it offers novel evidence on the mechanisms behind these effects.
First, I use a regression discontinuity design to show that the labels obtai-
ned in second grade math causally affect performance six years later among
rural males. Math performance is of special interest because it has been
shown to be a good predictor of readiness for post-secondary education
and future labor market outcomes (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Card and Payne,
2017). Marginally classifying as “remedial” in second grade math reduces the
overall score by 0.18 standard deviations in eighth grade, with reductions in
both math and language (of 0.11 and 0.21 standard deviations, respectively).
These magnitudes are comparable to the average effects of interventions of
structured pedagogy, which are the most effective type of educational inter-
vention found by Snilstveit et al. (2015), showing how important can be beha-
vioral inattention in the process of human capital accumulation. Furthermore,
barely classifying as “remedial” in second grade math increased the probabi-
lity of being classified as “warning” in eighth grade math and language. In line
with Papay, Murnane, and Willett (2016), these results suggest that labels,
even from low-stakes tests, can affect educational outcomes permanently,
especially among vulnerable groups.
Second, I investigate the mechanisms behind these effects, which is the
main contribution of this study over the previous empirical evidence. To do so
I exploit information on socioeconomic background, household investment in
educational inputs, child labor, perception of own academic skills, interaction
with parents at home, and the student’s perception of the classroom envi-
ronment. The analysis reveals that scoring marginally below the remedial
cutoff in second grade reduces household investment in educational inputs,
increases child labor, and makes students more likely to perceive a negative
classroom environment. The effects on perceptions of own skills and on an
index of family support are negative, but imprecisely estimated, suggesting
the first three channels are more important in this setting.
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The dataset has three main caveats worth considering. First, second-
grade performance data was matched for roughly 55% of all eighth graders
that took the test in 2015 (and 35% of rural males). Overall, unmatched stu-
dents belong to a lower socioeconomic status than matched students. Howe-
ver, section 5.4 shows that there are no signs that this threatens the internal
validity of the findings reported here. Second, by its nature, test score data
is available only for students who had not dropped out of school by eighth
grade. Moreover, since this is the first cohort who took the test in both gra-
des, these are students who had not been held back between second and
eighth grade. If behavioral inattention caused students to fail a grade or drop
out of school, the estimates reported here would be lower bounds on the total
effect of inattention on learning. A third, and perhaps the most important, ca-
veat relates to the timing of the mechanisms. This study uncovers changes
that have persisted through time, which makes them interesting and impor-
tant, but the data does not allow to disentangle the timing of these effects.
It does not allow show whether the changes in child labor, book ownership
and perceived school environment were immediate consequences of the test
outcomes or were caused by another variable.
The paper also speaks to other strands of literature. First, to the literatu-
re on human capital investment, showing that human capital investment can
be affected by cognitive biases. Second, to the labeling literature, providing
evidence on the unintended effects of labeling at early ages. Third, it contri-
butes to the debate on the effects of child labor. While some studies find no
or weak substitutability between child labor and schooling outcomes (Rava-
llion and Wodon, 2000; Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1997), the evidence
presented here suggests that child labor is associated with lower learning
even among children that are making adequate progress in school. Baland
and Robinson (2000) argue that child labor may materialize if parents fail to
fully internalize its negative effects. This study shows that it may also happen
if the students academic skills are underestimated.
The evidence provided by this study has two clear policy implications.
First, the school should foster improvements in classroom environment. Se-
cond, communication of test scores must be improved. The school should
also provide guidance and tools to parents and teachers to help children who
are labeled as remedial. This is especially important given the higher like-
lihood of receiving a “warning” label in eighth grade which could lead parents,
teachers and peers to reinforce the behaviors and attitudes triggered by the
second grade test results leading to a self-fulfilled prophecy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the theo-
iv
retical background, linking behavioral inattention with learning outcomes and
fleshing out the mechanisms that relate these variables. Section 3 descri-
bes the data and the study setting. Section 4 details the empirical approach.
Section 5 presents the results and discusses its robustness, and section 6
concludes.
12. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
When making choices, our attention is limited, because of the large num-
ber of dimensions to be considered in each choice and because of the high
frequency with which we need to make choices. In practice, we forcefully
take into account only a few considerations, usually those that are most sa-
lient to us. Neglecting the rest may carry serious consequences. For instan-
ce, a branch of literature has shown that consumers fail to assess the full
costs of purchasing a good.2 Most notably, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)
and Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2017) show inattention to taxes when they
are not included in the tag price. In turn, Ellison (2005); Gabaix and Laibson
(2006); Ellison and Ellison (2009), and Brown, Hossain, and Morgan (2010)
show inattention to other shrouded attributes, like small-font bank fees, or
“shipping and handling” costs. Inattention has also been documented in au-
tomobile purchases (Lacetera, Pope, and Sydnor, 2012), health plan choices
(Abaluck and Adams, 2017), and failing to refinance mortgages (Andersen
et al., 2015). Some studies, on the other hand, find results consistent with
full attention to key attributes of large purchases. For instance it has been
documented that consumers in the US pay full attention to fuel prices when
considering the purchase of a home (Myers, 2018) or cars (Busse, Knittel,
and Zettelmeyer, 2013).
Incomplete attention could play a role in education, especially in how stu-
dents, parents and teachers use test outcomes to estimate a student’s aca-
demic skills. Test scores usually have labels attached to them, like “remedial”
or “proficient”, that help interpret the score obtained by the student. Scores
contain finer information about performance than labels, but are more difficult
to interpret. Behavioral inattention to scores would lead to systematic biases
in the estimation of student skills, and it could appear if individuals focus on
the labels and disregard the scores.
To my knowledge, the only study that has shown evidence of behavio-
ral inattention to scores is Papay, Murnane, and Willett (2016). The authors
show that marginally earning positive labels in low-stakes standardized tests
during high school increases college enrollment compared to students that
scored barely below those thresholds, despite both the labels and the exact
scores being known by the students and their parents.3 Papay, Murnane,
2Gabaix (2019); DellaVigna (2009), and Caplin (2016) provide more comprehensive literature
surveys on behavioral inattention and theoretical tools to model this cognitive bias.
3Two recent studies shed light on the causal effect of labels by showing that marginally receiving
a higher integer score in high-stakes advanced placement exams affects college outcomes and
choice of majors in the US (Smith, Hurwitz, and Avery, 2017; Avery et al., 2018). However, these
2and Willett (2016) argue that performance in tests can affect students by ma-
king them eligible for educational interventions, by affecting the student’s self-
judgments, or by influencing the perceptions of parents, teachers, and peers.
The first mechanism is not relevant in this setting because no interventions
or policies are determined by the student’s individual test results. Thus, I in-
vestigate whether test scores affect perceptions about own skills, as well as
the perceptions of parents, teachers and peers. If a student is inattentive to
scores, her perceptions about own skills will be directly affected by the label
attached to her. Two comparable students with similar scores that happen
to fall at different sides of a given threshold will obtain different labels, which
will lead them to perceive themselves differently. Perceiving oneself as less
skilled can affect motivation, time studying, and overall investment in educa-
tion, hindering future performance and thus leading to self-fulfilled prophe-
cies. The same reasoning applies to peers, teachers and parents, who may
treat a student differently based on her perceived skills.
Standard economic models of educational investment suggest that hou-
seholds should reallocate resources in response to a change in expected
returns to schooling arising from low test scores. Dizon-Ross (2019) provi-
des evidence of this behavior in Malawi. Behavioral inattention implies that
households will overreact to more salient information, namely the label at-
tained by the student, and neglect information that is more complicated to
process or remember, like the test score itself. Under both the standard and
the behavioral framework, facing a lower return to formal education, parents
may purchase fewer inputs of academic skill formation, like books, and focus
on fostering non-academic skills that can counteract the (perceived) lack of
academic skills once their child enters the labor market.4 The difference is
that, if parents are fully attentive, the reallocation would be smooth across
the threshold, whereas if parents exhibit behavioral inattention the realloca-
tion would exhibit a discontinuity at the threshold.
Similarly, if teachers or peers are inattentive to scores, they may change
their attitudes towards students that marginally classify as remedial. Teachers
may lower their expectations of student performance, which has been shown
are not inattention studies because the continuous scores are known only to the econometrician,
not to the students, their families or teachers. A relatively larger, but less related, literature studies
the consequences of barely failing examinations (Machin, McNally, and Ruiz-Valenzuela, 2018;
Papay, Murnane, and Willett, 2010, 2014; Reardon et al., 2010).
4In rural settings, farm labor is the main substitute of formal schooling in income generation
(Jacoby, 1994; Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994). In fact, Meza and Pérez (2018) find that child labor in
rural Peru is negatively associated with schooling attainment but not with income during adulthood,
suggesting that additional experience may indeed compensate for reduced formal schooling in this
setting.
3to affect student outcomes (Jussim and Harber, 2005; Rosenthal and Ja-
cobson, 1968; Cooper and Good, 1983; Spencer, Steele, and Quinn, 1999;
Papageorge, Gershenson, and Kang, 2016). More recently, Carlana (2019)
and Alesina et al. (2018) show that teacher bias against girls and immigrants,
respectively, reduce learning outcomes against the stigmatized groups. The
effects of negative teacher attitudes could be worsened by the interaction
with peers. For instance, Kristoffersen et al. (2015) studies the detrimental
effects of disruptive students on their peers academic achievement in Den-
mark. A larger literature studies the detrimental effects of bullying on lear-
ning (Brown and Taylor, 2008; Eriksen, Nielsen, and Simonsen, 2014; Gutie-
rrez, Molina, and Ñopo, 2018). Interaction with peers is especially relevant
in Peru, since 71% of children aged 9-11 had suffered psychological violen-
ce from their peers at some point in their lifetime, while 40% had suffered
physical violence (75% had suffered either) (INEI, 2016a). Conversely, an
improved classroom environment can lead to academic gains, which are me-
diated through lower levels of classroom disruption and violence, improved
inter-student and student-teacher relationships, and lessened teachers’ fati-
gue (Lavy and Schlosser, 2011).
43. DATA AND STUDY SETTING
3.1. The Student Census Evaluation - ECE
The data source used in this study is the Student Census Evaluation,
ECE for its name in Spanish. ECE is a standardized test that the Ministry
of Education applies annually to measure learning outcomes among second
graders since 2006. Since 2015 the Ministry applies it to eighth graders as
well, which is the second year of high school in the Peruvian educational
system. The evaluation is applied to all students in the respective grade in all
private and public schools across the country. The test constitutes amilestone
in school dynamics, especially in primary-level public schools, and its results
are awaited by the school community and are an important determinant of
institutional climate (Sempé et al., 2017).
In an in-depth analysis of the use of ECE results, Estefania (2009) iden-
tifies four types of use:
1. Instrumental: as they can be used for decision making to improve tea-
ching practices in school.
2. Conceptual: as they allow a better understanding of the object of eva-
luation. In particular the scores can allow to identify students who face
difficulties.
3. For legitimacy: to justify past decisions made by the principals, tea-
chers or parents.
4. Symbolic: as an accountability mechanism towards the community and
parents.
These types of uses are not mutually exclusive, and can be present to
different degrees in each stakeholder. In fact, the first two are usually closely
linked. Sempé et al. (2017) trace the route of the reports, from delivery to
action. The authors document that most schools receive the reports. Howe-
ver, more than half the principals interviewed by the researchers admitted not
having read them. Teachers usually report having read the reports, but whi-
le some of them did so in detail, a considerable fraction read only the main
results and suggestions. Teachers hold meetings with parents, where they
explain the results and the labels. Teachers report that only the most concer-
ned parents pay close attention to the reports, while the rest only overlook
them. The evidence gathered by the authors suggests that the reports led to
little action on part of school staff and parents. Thus, in practice the latter two
types of use reported by Estefania (2009) seem more prominent in practice.
5Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the exact scores do not come
up in any of the interviews conducted to parents, teachers, and principals in
the report by Sempé et al. (2017). Interviewees only mention results based
on the level achieved by their students, which is suggestive of inattention to
scores.
Since 2015, the school-level results partly determine the allocation of
Bono Escuela, a monetary bonus allocated to the school teaching staff, but
from the student’s perspective ECE is a low-stakes test. The second gra-
de evaluation tests the students in two subjects: math and language. The
eighth grade evaluation tests the students in the same subjects.5 Based on
their score in each component, students can be classified as remedial (“en
inicio”), in transition (“en proceso”), or proficient (“satisfactorio”). The eighth
grade test includes an additional category, lower than remedial: “pre-inicio”,
which I translate as “warning” to match labels used in other studies. Students
and their parents receive both the child’s score and the label attached to
it. However, the ministry’s recommendations are not translated to teaching
practices (Sempé et al., 2017).
3.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The analysis in this paper is performed with data from students who took
the test in 2009 as second graders and in 2015 as eighth graders, the first
cohort to take the test in both grades. Importantly, the eighth grade evaluation
includes a post-test survey that allows to investigate the mediating channels
discussed in section 2. There are sets of questions on perceptions about
family support (e.g. “I talk with my parents about school work”), own percep-
tion of academic skills (e.g. “I can understand difficult topics in math”) and
perception of classroom environment (e.g. “in my school, teachers are res-
pectful of our answers even when we are wrong”). There are 20 questions
on student perceived academic skills, 15 questions on interaction with their
parents and family, and 21 questions on climate in the classroom. To avoid fal-
se positives that could arise from analyzing the questions individually, I used
principal component analysis (PCA) to create indices with all the available
questions under each category. Some statements denote desirable outco-
mes, like “my teachers give us additional help when we need it”, while others
refer to undesirable outcomes, like “my teachers make me feel bad when I
make a mistake”. To construct each index I created a set of indicators, one
for each statement, that take the value of 1 if the student replied “frequently”
5In 2016 a third subject was incorporated “social sciences” which includes history, geography
and economics.
6or “always” to a desirable outcome, or “rarely” or “never” to an undesirable
outcome. PCA was conducted on these indicators, and the index was cons-
tructed with the first principal component. The list of variables in each index,
as well as the mapping to the indicators used for the PCA, are reported in
Tables A.12 through A.14.
Table A.2 reports a set of statistics that showing that PCA is adequate in
this setting. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic ranges from 0.83 to 0.95, which
indicates that each group of variables is ideal for factor analysis. I use the first
principal component to construct each index. The eigen values are above the
commonly used threshold of 1, ranging from 3.23 to 6.61. The proportion of
the variance explained by these indices ranges from 21.6 to 33.9%.
The main descriptive statistics for the sample of students with data for
their second and eighth grade tests are presented in Table 1. The sample is
split by student gender and school location (urban or rural). The definition of
rurality used by the Ministry of Education is stricter than the more commonly
used definition of having fewer than 2,000 people in a settlement, mainly be-
cause the Ministry’s definition pools together the population of settlements
that are geographically contiguous. Table 1 shows small and non-systematic
differences betweenmales and females in socioeconomic characteristics and
learning outcomes, but rural students are notably worse off than their urban
counterparts. Parental education is lower in rural areas, with only 18% of
mothers and 30% of fathers having completed secondary schooling, compa-
red to more than 60 and 70% in urban areas, respectively. Rural students
are also more likely to have a parent who speaks an indigenous language
than urban students, at 24 and 4%, respectively. The Ministry constructed a
socioeconomic index based on asset ownership, which also indicates sizable
differences across populations. On average, rural students have a socioeco-
nomic index 1.4 standard deviations lower than that of urban students. These
differences are reflected in school performance. In second grade ECE, 55%
of rural students were classified as remedial in math and 33% in langua-
ge; while the figures for urban students were 32 and 10%, respectively. The
eighth grade ECE shows similar differences: 58% of rural students were clas-
sified as “warning” in math and 48% in language, compared to 27 and 14%,
respectively, of urban students.6
The mechanisms suggested by the literature that are relevant in this set-
6Descriptive statistics for unmatched students, those for whom there is no data on their se-
cond grade test, are provided in appendix table A.1. Overall, matched students are better-off in
socioeconomic status and test performance. Section 5.4 shows that this type of sample selection
is unlikely to affect internal validity, as all available observable characteristics are balanced at the
threshold.
7ting, as discussed in section 2 are family support, classroom environment,
perceptions of own skills, and household investment in education. Table 2
shows that there are considerable differences across genders in these varia-
bles. Males have weaker interaction with their families than females. Somew-
hat surprisingly, males report lower confidence on their own academic skills
than females, with a difference of 0.10 standard deviations in rural areas and
0.15 in urban areas. On average, males have a more negative perception of
their classroom environment, at 0.15 standard deviations in rural areas and
0.11 standard deviations in rural areas. There is a clear difference by area in
this dimension, as the index for rural males is 0.16 standard deviations hig-
her than that of their urban counterparts. Book availability is similar across
genders, but as expected, books are more widely available in urban areas.
Students are also asked if they would drop out immediately if they could. Stu-
dents who say they would drop out are asked the reason, and 41% of rural
males report “because I have to work”, which is the proxy I use for child labor.
The figure for rural females is similar, at 38%, and lower in urban areas, at
18 and 11% for males and females, respectively. Regrettably, this question
is not asked to all students. However, this figures are well in line with country-
wide child labor figures: in rural Peru 52% of children and youths aged 5-17
work, while the figure for urban areas is 16% (INEI, 2016b).
84. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
4.1. Outcome variables
These are the main outcome variables studied in the paper:
1. Standardized math score: math score was standardized by subtracting
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation
2. Standardized language score: language score was standardized by sub-
tracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation
3. Standardized overall score: is the sum ofmath and language. This score
is standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation.
4. Percent Warning, math: Percent of the students that were classified as
“warning” in math
5. Percent Remedial, math: Percent of the students that were classified
as “warning” or “remedial” in math
6. Percent In transition, math: Percent of the students that were classified
as “warning”, “remedial” or “in transition” in math
7. Percent Warning, language: Percent of the students that were classified
as “warning” in language
8. Percent Remedial, language: Percent of the students that were classi-
fied as “warning” or “remedial” in language
9. Percent In transition, language: Percent of the students that were clas-
sified as “warning”, “remedial” or “in transition” in language
10. Percent Warning, overall: Percent of the students that were classified
as “warning” in both subjects.
11. Percent Remedial, overall: Percent of the students that were classified
as “warning” or “remedial” in both subjects.
12. Percent In transition, overall: Percent of the students that were classi-
fied as “warning”, “remedial” or “in transition” in both subjects.
4.2. Econometric Analysis
I apply a regression discontinuity design around the threshold used by
the Ministry of Education for classifying students as “remedial” versus “in pro-
gress”.7 The estimating regression is:
7There is another category, “proficient”, for scores above 640 but the RD design lacks statistical
power to detect effects at this threshold. Appendix A.15 shows that, based on ex-post power
9yi = α+ f(xi) + δI(xi ≤ c) + εi (1)
yi is student i’s eighth grade score (overall, math or communications), xi
is the student’s second grade math score, c is the threshold between “reme-
dial” and “in transition” (512 points) and f() is an unknown function, which is
estimated with first-order local polynomials, using second-order polynomial
to correct for bias, as suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014)
and Calonico, Cattaneo, and Farrell (2018). In this equation, δ measures the
effect of marginally scoring as remedial. A statistically significant value is evi-
dence of behavioral inattention, while lack of significance is consistent with
either complete attention or with that crossing the cutoff is not perceived as
relevant. Standard errors are calculated using the heteroskedasticity-robust
nearest neighbor variance estimator with at least three neighbors. Given that
the treatment is the information received by the student, it is not necessary
to cluster the standard errors (Abadie et al., 2017).8
Given the structural differences by area of residence and gender discus-
sed in the previous section, I estimate the regressions separately for each
subgroup. Since themain regression was estimated in four subsamples, I rely
on the false discovery rate (FDR) q-values (Anderson, 2008) to avoid false
positives. In addition, following the methodology outlined in Lee, Miguel, and
Wolfram (2019), I first estimate a regression with an overall outcome as de-
pendent variable, namely the total test score. If there is a significant change
in the overall outcome, the regression is estimated also on its components,
i.e. the math and language score (or on the reaching the different labels in
each of these components), as well as on the mechanisms that should lead
to these changes. Here again, I control for multiple hypotheses testing with
FDR q-values. Regressions related to test components and mechanisms for
which the overall score did not show significant changes are reported in the
online appendix.
calculations, the minimum detectable effects at these threshold are substantially larger than the
effects observed in the data.
8Figure A.1 shows that the main results and their statistical significance are unchanged if the
standard errors are calculated clustering at the province level or clustering at the province level
and using three nearest neighbors.
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5. RESULTS
5.1. Effects on test performance
Figure 1 presents the main results in the paper. The horizontal axis mea-
sures second grade test scores, and the vertical axis measures eighth grade
scores. Marginally scoring as “remedial” in second grade math significantly
reduced eighth grade scores by 0.18 standard deviations among rural males
(FDR q-value = 0.04). The optimal bandwidth is 38 points at each side of the
threshold. Given the distribution of scores, this implies that the RD results are
valid for 26% of rural males in the sample. Figure A.2 shows that the effects
in the other three subsamples are small and not statistically significant. The
effect being present only among rural males is consistent with males being
expected to be better at math than females (Spencer, Steele, and Quinn,
1999) together with the results from Sempé et al. (2017) who find that ECE
scores are much more important for students, parents and teachers in rural
than urban schools, as discussed earlier.
Column 1 in Table 3 reports the effects of scoring just below the remedial
cutoff in second grade on eighth grade scores, for the sample of rural males.
Row 1 shows the effect on the overall score reported above, and rows 2 and
3 show the effects disaggregated by test component, math and language.
By eighth grade, rural males lost 0.11 standard deviations in math and 0.21
standard deviations in language for having marginally classified as remedial
in second grade math. These effects of similar magnitude as the average ef-
fect of structured pedagogy interventions, the most effective interventions in
terms of learning found in the review by Snilstveit et al. (2015), and are larger
than the average effects found in computer and community-based interven-
tions (Snilstveit et al., 2015).
Columns 2-4 in Table 3 report the effects of second grade math score
on the label attained in eighth grade, shedding further light on the nature of
the effects found in Column 1. Scoring marginally below the “remedial” cutoff
in second grade math increased the probability of classifying as “warning”
in language six years later by 18 percentage points, respectively. More im-
portantly, it increased the probability of receiving a label of “warning” in both
subjects by 14 percentage points. These are considerable effects, ranging
from 36-37% of the overall rates. There are no statistically or economically
significant effects on the probability of reaching other labels. Overall, this evi-
dence suggests that marginally earning the “remedial” label in second grade
math traps rural boys in the lowest end of the scores distribution.
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5.2. Mechanisms
Table 4 investigates the mechanisms behind the effects reported in the
previous section, grouped as interaction with family, perceptions of own skills,
perception of classroom environment, and household investment in human
capital. Marginally classifying as remedial in second grade math reduced the
family support index by 0.12 standard deviations six years later, although the
estimate is not statistically significant. Similarly, own perception of academic
skills decreased by 0.15 standard deviations, but this coefficient is not statis-
tically significant either. On the other hand, column 3 shows that the negative
classroom environment index, which reflects the student’s perception about
teacher and peer behavior, increased by 0.29 standard deviations. Given the
evidence on the effect of teacher and peer behavior on school performance,
an effect of this magnitude could be instrumental in explaining to a consi-
derable extent the findings reported in the previous section. Next, columns
4 and 5 explore mechanisms related to parental decisions. Marginally sco-
ring as remedial in second grade math increases the probability of students
reporting they have to work by 21 percentage points and reduces by 46 per-
centage points less likely to have five or more books available at home. To-
gether, these columns suggest that parents invest significantly less in inputs
like textbooks and increase child labor relative to parents of essentially iden-
tical children who barely escaped the “remedial” label in second grade math.
This is in line with the main findings by Dizon-Ross (2019), the key difference
being that parents in this study setting overreact to negligible differences in
scores.
Thus, classroom environment and household resource reallocation are
two likely mediating channels behind the effects caused by marginally attai-
ning the remedial label in second grade math. However, given that the data
on outcomes and mechanisms was collected at the same time, it is not possi-
ble to assert whether these channels are a direct consequence of inattention
to scores, if one of them triggered the other, or if they were both triggered by
some other variable that is not observable in the dataset.
5.3. Robustness checks
This section discusses the results of two types of robustness checks: to
changes in bandwidth and in the degree of the polynomial used to estimate
the RD and to correct for the bias discussed in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiu-
nik (2014). The results of the first robustness check are reported in Figure 2.
The dependent variable in each panel are the standardized total, math, and
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language scores, the main outcome variables. The horizontal axis measures
alternative bandwidths as a proportion of the optimal bandwidth selected by
the methodology developed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). The
vertical axis shows the RD estimate obtained using the bandwidth indicated in
the horizontal axis. The dotted lines indicate the RD estimate with the optimal
bandwidth, as well as its 95% bias-corrected confidence interval. Panel (a)
shows that in all cases the resulting coefficient on total score always falls wit-
hin the 95% confidence interval of the optimal-bandwidth coefficient. Panel
(b) shows the same for math score. Panel (c) shows that this is the case also
for language score for all but the 50% bandwidth. Next, Figure 3 explores the
robustness of the mechanisms that were found relevant in section 5.2. Panel
(a) shows that the effects on the index of perceived classroom environment
fall within the optimal-bandwidth confidence interval. Panels (b) and (c) show
that the effects on family investment are less robust. The effects on book ow-
nership are robust for bandwidths from 70 to 140% of the optimal bandwidth,
while the effects on work are robust for bandwidths from 50 to 140% of the
optimal bandwidth.
Figure 4 examines the sensitivity of the results to the functional form used
to estimate equation (1). The figure compares the main results, obtained with
local linear regressions, to the results obtained using local quadratic and local
kernel regressions, as suggested by Gelman and Imbens (2019). The point
estimates are essentially unchanged, and fall well within the 95% confidence
intervals of the benchmark model.
Therefore altogether, the effects on the main outcomes are robust to choi-
ce of bandwidth. The most robust mechanism is classroom environment, alt-
hough book availability and child labor are robust over a considerable range
of bandwidths. The effects on outcomes and mechanisms are robust to the
functional form used to estimate equation (1).
5.4. Threats to validity
Regression discontinuity design relies on two main identification assum-
ptions: that no other variable must change discontinuously at the threshold
and that there is no manipulation of the running variable at the threshold.
The dataset contains a number of variables that can assist in assessing the
first assumption, including socioeconomic status, parental education, paren-
tal ethnicity, and probability of having attended preschool. Using the same
specification as equation (1), Table A.3 shows that none of these characte-
ristics varies discontinuously at the “remedial” threshold. Given that the nega-
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tive class environment could be operating at the classroom or school level,
it would be interesting to check specifically for second grade classroom or
school characteristics. Regrettably, this information is not available in the da-
taset.
The second assumption requires no manipulation of the scores at the th-
reshold, which could indicate differences in unobservable variables at the
threshold. Manipulation in this context is highly unlikely given that each stu-
dent takes the test only once, they are not aware of the correct answers and
they do not know the score they will obtain, so there is no realistic way for
them to manipulate their scores just a few points to score at either side of the
threshold. Appendix figure A.3 formally shows there is no evidence of score
manipulation at the cutoff point using the McCrary test. The lack of bunching
at the threshold also rules out the possibility that teachers nudge students
who classified as remedial in second grade to miss the eighth grade ECE to
improve the staff’s chances of receiving the monetary bonus “Bono Escuela”.
Lacking nationally unique IDs in the dataset, Ministry of Education staff
matched student scores across grades based on full names (first name,midd-
le name, father’s last name and mother’s last name). In this setting, 55% of
the students who took the eighth grade test had their second grade scores
matched.9 There are two main reasons for a student in eighth grade not to
have his or her second grade test outcomes in the dataset. First, any miss-
pelling prevented matches from being made. Despite this issue, a stricter
matching protocol was favored to prevent false matches that could introduce
measurement error. Second, some students may have not taken the second
grade test because of absence on the test date or because their school did
not have enough students in second grade to be tested. While 92% of eighth
graders in the country effectively took the test in 2015, the figure for second
graders in 2009 was lower, at 81% (Ministerio de Educación, 2009, 2015).
The reason for this difference is that the test is administered in all schools
that have at least five students enrolled in the respective grade, and some
primary schools fail this criterion while most secondary schools meet it. The
internal validity of the results of this paper could be threatened by a discon-
tinuous change in the probability of matching at the second grade remedial
threshold. It is not possible to test directly for this discontinuity with the data
provided by the Ministry, since it includes information for matched students
only, so the second grade score for unmatched students is not observable.
However, a discontinuity of this sort is highly unlikely, given that students are
9The matching rates are 36% for rural males, 40% for rural females, 56% for urban males,
and 60% for urban females.
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balanced in the available observable characteristics (Table A.3) together with
the lack of bunching at the threshold (Figure A.3). In addition, if the probabi-
lity of matching changed discontinuously at the second grade math threshold,
one would expect this discontinuity to be present also in eighth grade sco-
res, especially given the persistence of the type of changes uncovered in this
paper. Table A.4 shows that there is no such discontinuity, further alleviating
concerns about internal validity.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows that labels attached to students at a young age can af-
fect learning outcomes persistently, and that this is largely due to inattention
to test scores. Marginally earning a “remedial” label in a low-stakes second
grade math test reduced scores six years later by 0.18 standard deviations
(0.11 SD in math, 0.21 SD in language), and substantially increases the like-
lihood of obtaining “warning” labels in those subjects. These effects are lar-
ge, comparable in magnitude to the average effects of structured pedagogy,
which -in terms of learning- are the most effective educational interventions
found in the systematic review by Snilstveit et al. (2015), and are higher than
the average effects found for computer interventions and community-based
monitoring (Snilstveit et al., 2015).10 These effects are not only large, they
are valid for a considerable proportion of the sample. Given the distribution
of scores around the threshold, the optimal bandwidth implies that these re-
sults are valid for 26% of rural males in the study sample.
The only previous study on inattention to test scores is Papay, Murnane,
and Willett (2016). The authors document the existence of limited attention
to scores, but their data do not allow to investigate the mechanisms. Besides
being the first study of behavioral inattention to test scores in a developing
country, this study is the first to provide evidence on the main mechanisms
suggested by the education literature, and shows that classroom environment
and household resource reallocation are important driving forces behind the
effects on learning outcomes. This suggests a role for parental, peer and
teacher inattention that may reinforce the student’s own cognitive biases.
This paper has two main limitations worth considering. First, there is a li-
mitation regarding the timing of measurement of the mechanisms. The varia-
bles used to investigate outcomes and mechanisms are measured in eighth
grade. The lack of information about what happened immediately after the
second grade scores and labels were reported to parents and students com-
plicates somewhat the interpretation of the causal chain. For instance, it is
not clear if child labor was triggered directly by the second grade label, or
if the label triggered a more subtle resource reallocation that further redu-
ced the child’s school performance, lowering further the expected returns to
schooling, and triggering child labor. However, it is possible to conclude that
10In a systematic review of education interventions in low andmiddle-income countries, Snilstveit
et al. (2015) report that, on average, school feeding programs improve learning in math by 0.10
SD and 0.09 SD in language. Structured pedagogy interventions improve math by 0.14 SD and
language by 0.23 SD. Computer interventions improve learning in math by 0.07 SD and language
by 0.01 SD. Community based monitoring improve math 0.09 SD and language 0.12 SD.
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by eighth grade, perception of a negative classroom environment, child labor,
and reduced book ownership are forces behind the reduction in test scores
described above, and that the changes in these variables have been trigge-
red either directly or indirectly, by marginally obtaining a “remedial” label in
second grade math. This calls for further research to pin down the causal
chain of the mechanisms. Second, and a consequence of the first one, is
that the study cannot provide estimates of inattention parameters, which are
theoretically interesting and empirically scarce. This is because the effects
on outcomes are result of the combined inattention of parents, teachers, stu-
dents and their peers, and it is not possible to disentangle the contribution on
each of them.
Two main policy implications arise from this study. First is the need for
better communication with teachers, parents and students about their scores
and how to interpret them. Besides improved communication, schools should
provide all stakeholders with tools to improve learning among struggling stu-
dents. Second, there should be efforts to improve classroom environment,
which has been shown to boost learning outcomes (Lavy and Schlosser,
2011; Gutierrez, Molina, and Ñopo, 2018).
The findings in this document support the importance of strategies like
the Ministry of Education’s “Paz Escolar”, which aimed precisely at impro-
ving school and class environment. Finally, the evidence presented in this
document speaks to the importance of continuing with policies like “Soporte
Pedagogico” which had a component of support to students with poor aca-
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8. TABLES
Cuadro 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Rural Rural Urban Urban
Males Females Males Females
Number of Observations 10,543 10,185 123,436 129,188
% of Subsample 0.3585 0.4037 0.5584 0.6045
Indigenous language 0.2381 0.2429 0.0393 0.0400
(0.4259) (0.4288) (0.1944) (0.1960)
Mother has secondary 0.1784 0.1641 0.6471 0.6072
education (0.3829) (0.3704) (0.4779) (0.4884)
Father has education 0.3040 0.3061 0.7290 0.7172
secondary (0.4600) (0.4609) (0.4445) (0.4504)
Socio Economic Index -1.1294 -1.1600 0.3376 0.2566
(0.7991) (0.7645) (0.8524) (0.8618)
Remedial math, 2nd grade 0.5456 0.5590 0.3143 0.3470
(0.4979) (0.4965) (0.4642) (0.4760)
In transition math, 2nd grade 0.3577 0.3451 0.4526 0.4665
(0.4794) (0.4754) (0.4977) (0.4989)
Proficient math, 2nd grade 0.0965 0.0954 0.2327 0.1861
(0.2953) (0.2938) (0.4226) (0.3892)
Remedial language, 2nd grade 0.3440 0.3274 0.1091 0.0957
(0.4751) (0.4693) (0.3118) (0.2942)
In transition language, 2nd grade 0.5373 0.5392 0.5756 0.5494
(0.4986) (0.4985) (0.4943) (0.4976)
Proficient language, 2nd grade 0.1187 0.1334 0.3152 0.3549
(0.3234) (0.3400) (0.4646) (0.4785)
Note: Continues in next page.
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Table 1 (continued) Descriptive statistics
Variable Rural Rural Urban Urban
Males Females Males Females
Warning math, 8th grade 0.5427 0.6174 0.2484 0.2947
(0.4982) (0.4861) (0.4321) (0.4559)
Remedial math, 8th grade 0.3654 0.3109 0.4170 0.4372
(0.4816) (0.4629) (0.4931) (0.4960)
In transition math, 8th grade 0.0617 0.0504 0.1717 0.1546
(0.2407) (0.2187) (0.3771) (0.3615)
Proficient math, 8th grade 0.0302 0.0213 0.1629 0.1135
(0.1710) (0.1444) (0.3693) (0.3172)
Warning language, 8th grade 0.4793 0.4854 0.1401 0.1361
(0.4996) (0.4998) (0.3471) (0.3429)
Remedial language, 8th grade 0.3987 0.3897 0.3799 0.3737
(0.4896) (0.4877) (0.4854) (0.4838)
In transition language, 8th grade 0.0957 0.0941 0.2787 0.2763
(0.2942) (0.2919) (0.4484) (0.4472)
Proficient language, 8th grade 0.0264 0.0308 0.2012 0.2139
(0.1602) (0.1729) (0.4009) (0.4101)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Source: Own elaboration based on 2009 and 2015
ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro 2: Descriptive statistics: mechanisms suggested by the literature
Variable Rural Rural Urban Urban
Males Females Males Females
Interaction with family -0.0500 0.0252 -0.0184 0.0688
(0.9947) (1.0018) (0.9983) (1.0033)
Perception of own skills -0.0064 0.0921 -0.1491 -0.0041
(0.9985) (1.0180) (0.9515) (0.9990)
Negative classroom environment 0.1536 0.0138 -0.0121 -0.1159
(1.1213) (1.0397) (0.9872) (0.8958)
Five or more books at home 0.7269 0.7629 0.8881 0.9012
(0.4456) (0.4253) (0.3152) (0.2983)
Would dropout if possible 0.4114 0.3843 0.2083 0.1730
(0.4921) (0.4864) (0.4061) (0.3782)
Would dropout because of work 0.4106 0.3141 0.1815 0.1104
(0.4920) (0.4642) (0.3855) (0.3134)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Source: Own elaboration based on 2009 and 2015
ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro 3: Effect of being classified as remedial in second grade math on eighth
grade performance, rural males
Subject Standardized % % % In
scores Warning Remedial transition
Overall -0.175 0.144 0.009 0.021
(0.067) (0.043) (0.029) (0.018)
Math -0.109 0.099 -0.001 0.013
(0.058) (0.056) (0.025) (0.013)
Language -0.208 0.180 -0.012 0.011
(0.074) (0.045) (0.032) (0.011)
Total Score
Mean -0.625 0.386 0.860 0.967
Bias-robust p-value 0.011 0.002 0.847 0.304
FDR q-value 0.017 0.009 0.863 0.527
Math
Mean -0.460 0.562 0.924 0.979
Bias-robust p-value 0.077 0.097 0.863 0.345
FDR q-value 0.077 0.291 0.863 0.527
Language
Mean -0.699 0.494 0.896 0.982
Bias-robust p-value 0.005 0.000 0.651 0.351
FDR q-value 0.015 0.001 0.837 0.527
Observations 9,523 9,523 9,523 9,523
Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is the standardized score in eighth grade, in columns
2-4 is the probability of scoring at or below the level indicated by the columns. The row indicates
the subject. The first row indicates the effect on total score (column 1) and the probability of scoring
at or below the level indicated by the column in both subjects (columns 2-4). Heteroskedasticity-
robust covariance matrix with at least three nearest neighbors. Source: Own elaboration based on
2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro 4: Mechanisms, rural males
Family Academic Negative class books
Support Skills environment work at home
Math score < 512 -0.116 -0.154 0.291 0.218 -0.462
(0.381) (0.132) (0.127) (0.081) (0.187)
Mean -0.056 0.012 0.168 0.416 0.725
Bias-robust p-value 0.805 0.265 0.019 0.004 0.015
FDR q-value 0.805 0.332 0.032 0.002 0.032
Observations 8,419 7,887 7,393 4,795 9,006
Notes: The outcome variable is indicated by the column titles. The first three columns are indices
of family support, perception about own academic skills and perception of a negative classroom
environment. Column (4) is an indicator of child labor. Column (5) is an indicator of the student’s
household owning five or more books. Heteroskedasticity-robust covariance matrix with at least
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Figura 2: Robustness to bandwidth selection - main outcomes
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Notes: The vertical axis measures the estimated RD effect (in standard deviations) with the band-
width indicated in the horizontal axis. Bandwidths range from 50% to 200% of the optimal band-
width selected by (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014; Calonico, Cattaneo, and Farrell, 2018).
The solid vertical line indicates the optimal bandwidth. Dotted lines indicate the estimated RD ef-
fect and its confidence interval resulting from the optimal bandwidth. Source: Own elaboration,
based on 2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education
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Figura 3: Robustness to bandwidth selection - mechanisms
(a) Negative classroom environment
Upper Bound, 95% CI
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Notes: The vertical axis measures the estimated RD effect (in standard deviations) with the band-
width indicated in the horizontal axis. Bandwidths range from 50% to 200% of the optimal band-
width selected by (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik, 2014; Calonico, Cattaneo, and Farrell, 2018).
The solid vertical line indicates the optimal bandwidth. Dotted lines indicate the estimated RD ef-
fect and its confidence interval resulting from the optimal bandwidth. Source: Own elaboration,
based on 2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education
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Score Math Language Classroom Environ. Work Books
95% CI linear quadratic kernel (triangular)
Notes: The vertical axis indicates the estimated RD effect resulting from estimating equation (1)
with local polynomials of degrees one, two, and with the triangular kernel. The bias-corrected
confidence intervals are reported for the local polynomial of degree one. Source: Own elaboration,
based on 2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education
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10. APPENDIX
Cuadro A.1: Descriptive statistics (unmatched sample)
Variable Rural Rural Urban Urban
Males Females Males Females
Number of Observations 18,867 15,046 97,625 84,517
% of Subsample 0.6415 0.5963 0.4416 0.3955
Indigenous language 0.3638 0.4009 0.0979 0.1039
(0.4811) (0.4901) (0.2972) (0.3051)
Moms education secondary 0.1452 0.1333 0.4975 0.4695
(0.3523) (0.3399) (0.5000) (0.4991)
Dads education secondary 0.2575 0.2621 0.6050 0.6035
(0.4372) (0.4398) (0.4889) (0.4892)
Socio Economic Index -1.2637 -1.3161 -0.0058 -0.0785
(0.7728) (0.7361) (0.9520) (0.9544)
Warning math, 8th grade 0.6511 0.7336 0.3958 0.4616
(0.4766) (0.4421) (0.4890) (0.4985)
Remedial math, 8th grade 0.2891 0.2215 0.4164 0.3923
(0.4534) (0.4153) (0.4930) (0.4883)
In transition math, 8th grade 0.0412 0.0312 0.1153 0.0941
(0.1987) (0.1738) (0.3194) (0.2920)
Proficient math, 8th grade 0.0186 0.0137 0.0725 0.0519
(0.1351) (0.1162) (0.2592) (0.2218)
Warning comm, 8th grade 0.5954 0.6342 0.2611 0.2686
(0.4908) (0.4817) (0.4393) (0.4432)
Remedial comm, 8th grade 0.3297 0.2974 0.4257 0.4117
(0.4701) (0.4571) (0.4945) (0.4921)
In transition comm, 8th grade 0.0594 0.0540 0.2088 0.2026
(0.2364) (0.2260) (0.4065) (0.4020)
Proficient comm, 8th grade 0.0155 0.0144 0.1043 0.1171
(0.1234) (0.1192) (0.3056) (0.3216)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Source: Own elaboration, based on 2015 ECE, Mi-
nistry of Education.
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Cuadro A.2: PCA Statistics
Index KMO Eigen Proportion
Statistic Value Explained
Perception of own skills 0.947 6.78 33.9%
Family support 0.829 3.23 21.6%
Negative classroom environment 0.937 6.61 31.5%
Notes: The first column reports the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic. The second column reports the
eigen value of the first principal component. The third column reports the proportion of variance
explained by the first principal component. Source: Own elaboration, based on 2015 ECE, Ministry
of Education
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Cuadro A.3: Balance at the “remedial” threshold
Variable Rural Rural Urban Urban
Males Females Males Females
Socioeconomic Index -0.1846 -0.0543 0.0211 -0.0033
(0.1080) (0.0863) (0.0139) (0.0163)
Mom indigenous 0.0389 0.0152 -0.0028 0.0016
(0.0974) (0.0562) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Dad indigenous 0.0724 0.0003 -0.0018 0.0005
(0.0613) (0.0498) (0.0030) (0.0028)
Mom secondary -0.0452 -0.0043 0.0156 -0.0022
(0.0472) (0.0352) (0.0083) (0.0080)
Dad secondary -0.0414 0.0091 0.0048 -0.0060
(0.0413) (0.0663) (0.0087) (0.0079)
Attended preschool -0.0588 0.0546 -0.0015 -0.0004
(0.0417) (0.0549) (0.0058) (0.0050)
Bias-robust p-value, SE index 0.1316 0.5838 0.6463 0.3845
Bias-robust p-val, mom indig 0.7316 0.8871 0.4431 0.2571
Bias-robust p-val, dad indig 0.3655 0.9874 0.9077 0.3525
Bias-robust p-val, mom secondary 0.3489 0.9783 0.1948 0.3329
Bias-robust p-val, dad secondary 0.3136 0.9190 0.9192 0.1555
Bias-robust p-val, preschool 0.2430 0.3142 0.6274 0.5581
Observations 9,449 9,144 93,273 103,702
Notes: Each cell reports the regression discontinuity estimate at the remedial threshold in se-
cond grade math on the variable indicated by the row, for the sample indicated in the column.
Heteroskedasticity-robust covariance matrix with at least three nearest neighbors. Source: Own
elaboration, based on 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro A.4: Change in probability of attrition at eighth grade math score
threshold
Variable Rural Rural Urban Urban
Males Females Males Females
Math Score<512 0.0163 0.0060 0.0106 -0.0038
(0.0179) (0.0187) (0.0093) (0.0070)
Bias-robust p-value 0.3725 0.7040 0.1917 0.4718
Mean 0.6444 0.5986 0.4705 0.4142
Number of observations 28,599 24,716 189,534 191,216
Notes: Each column reports the regression discontinuity estimate at the remedial threshold in
eighth grade math on the probability of a student having his or her data matched with the second
grade results. Heteroskedasticity-robust covariance matrix with at least three nearest neighbors.
Source: Own elaboration, based on 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro A.5: Effect of being classified as remedial in second grade math on
eighth grade performance category, rural females
Subject Standardized % % % In
Score Warning Remedial transition
Overall 0.033 -0.040 0.011 0.002
(0.058) (0.053) (0.041) (0.024)
Math 0.357 -0.249 -0.011 -0.028
(0.264) (0.147) (0.106) (0.038)
Language skills 0.041 0.002 0.009 0.016
(0.071) (0.042) (0.026) (0.013)
Mean, overall -0.685 0.422 0.866 0.967
Bias-robust p-value, overall 0.586 0.458 0.678 0.838
Mean, math -0.576 0.635 0.942 0.985
Bias-robust p-value, math 0.204 0.105 0.932 0.501
Mean, languange skills -0.694 0.498 0.889 0.977
Bias-robust p-value, language 0.703 0.835 0.669 0.168
Observations 9,209 9,209 9,209 9,209
Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is the standardized score in eighth grade, in columns
2-4 is the probability of scoring at or below the level indicated by the columns. The row indicates
the subject. The first row indicates the effect on total score (column 1) and the probability of scoring
at or below the level indicated by the column in both subjects (columns 2-4). Heteroskedasticity-
robust covariance matrix with at least three nearest neighbors. Source: Own elaboration, based
on 2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro A.6: Effect of being classified as remedial in second grade math on
eighth grade performance category, urban males
Subject Standardized % % % In
Score Warning Remedial transition
Overall 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 0.001
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Math -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005
(0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
Language skills 0.013 0.000 -0.002 0.003
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005)
Mean, overall 0.058 0.122 0.561 0.840
Bias-robust p-value, overall 0.754 0.732 0.528 0.725
Mean, math 0.064 0.305 0.772 0.922
Bias-robust p-value, math 0.806 0.902 0.480 0.238
Mean, languange skills 0.043 0.172 0.612 0.879
Bias-robust p-value, language 0.483 0.495 0.548 0.952
Observations 94,719 94,719 94,719 94,719
Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is the standardized score in eighth grade, in columns
2-4 is the probability of scoring at or below the level indicated by the columns. The row indicates
the subject. The first row indicates the effect on total score (column 1) and the probability of scoring
at or below the level indicated by the column in both subjects (columns 2-4). Heteroskedasticity-
robust covariance matrix with at least three nearest neighbors. Source: Own elaboration, based
on 2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro A.7: Effect of being classified as remedial in second grade math on
eighth grade performance category, urban females
Subject Standardized % % % In
Score Warning Remedial transition
Overall 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Math -0.000 0.004 0.001 -0.006
(0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004)
Language skills -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.005
(0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Mean, overall 0.049 0.122 0.545 0.828
Bias-robust p-value, overall 0.977 0.734 0.722 0.918
Mean, math -0.035 0.341 0.809 0.941
Bias-robust p-value, math 0.770 0.554 0.656 0.048
Mean, languange skills 0.127 0.158 0.575 0.848
Bias-robust p-value, language 0.670 0.523 0.756 0.685
Observations 105,135 105,135 105,135 105,135
Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is the standardized score in eighth grade, in columns
2-4 is the probability of scoring at or below the level indicated by the columns. The row indicates
the subject. The first row indicates the effect on total score (column 1) and the probability of scoring
at or below the level indicated by the column in both subjects (columns 2-4). Heteroskedasticity-
robust covariance matrix with at least three nearest neighbors. Source: Own elaboration, based
on 2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro A.8: Effects of crossing other thresholds on eighth-grade standardized
scores
Threshold Rural Rural Urban Urban
Males Females Males Females
Math, Proficient -0.0279 0.1137 -0.0269 0.0048
(0.0758) (0.0875) (0.0134) (0.0129)
Language, Remedial 0.0280 -0.0005 0.0030 0.0350
(0.0527) (0.0567) (0.0171) (0.0162)
Language, Proficient 0.1319 0.0268 -0.0072 -0.0346
(0.1004) (0.0902) (0.0137) (0.0122)
Bias-robust p-val, math profic 0.780 0.249 0.298 0.804
Bias-robust p-val, lang remedial 0.513 0.895 0.921 0.048
Bias-robust p-val, lang profic 0.479 0.668 0.621 0.870
Observations 4,791 4,484 84,561 84,272
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated discontinuity in standardized eighth-grade scores at the
second-grade threshold indicated by the row title, for the subpopulation indicated by the column.
Heteroskedasticity-robust covariance matrix with at least three nearest neighbors. Source: Own
elaboration, based on 2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro A.9: Mechanisms, rural females
Family Academic Negative class books
Support Skills environment work at home
Math score < 512 0.041 -0.166 -0.111 0.016 0.050
(0.097) (0.092) (0.140) (0.079) (0.053)
Mean 0.024 0.104 0.027 0.316 0.758
Bias-robust p-value 0.764 0.070 0.411 0.879 0.421
Observations 7,914 7,383 6,702 4,482 8,740
Notes: The outcome variable is indicated by the column titles. The first three columns are indices
of family support, perception about own academic skills and perception of a negative classroom
environment. Column (4) is an indicator of child labor. Column (5) is an indicator of the student’s
household owning five or more books. Heteroskedasticity-robust covariance matrix with at least
three nearest neighbors. Source: Own elaboration, based on 2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of
Education.
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Cuadro A.10: Mechanisms, urban males
Family Academic Negative class books
Support Skills environment work at home
Math score < 512 0.027 -0.037 -0.021 -0.011 0.009
(0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.006)
Mean -0.051 -0.064 0.008 0.190 0.875
Bias-robust p-value 0.245 0.054 0.299 0.493 0.194
Observations 86,226 80,986 77,219 29,691 89,829
Notes: The outcome variable is indicated by the column titles. The first three columns are indices
of family support, perception about own academic skills and perception of a negative classroom
environment. Column (4) is an indicator of child labor. Column (5) is an indicator of the student’s
household owning five or more books. Heteroskedasticity-robust covariance matrix with at least
three nearest neighbors. Source: Own elaboration, based on 2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of
Education.
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Cuadro A.11: Mechanisms, urban females
Family Academic Negative class books
Support Skills environment work at home
Math score < 512 0.033 -0.010 0.007 0.002 0.011
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.005)
Mean 0.042 0.063 -0.107 0.114 0.892
Bias-robust p-value 0.208 0.164 0.638 0.821 0.033
Observations 95,491 90,221 84,431 29,870 100,317
Notes: The outcome variable is indicated by the column titles. The first three columns are indices
of family support, perception about own academic skills and perception of a negative classroom
environment. Column (4) is an indicator of child labor. Column (5) is an indicator of the student’s
household owning five or more books. Heteroskedasticity-robust covariance matrix with at least
three nearest neighbors. Source: Own elaboration, based on 2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of
Education.
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Cuadro A.12: Components of “interaction with family” index
Statement [1] [2] [3] [4]
My parents and I talk about homework. 0 0 1 1
My parents help me with homework. 0 0 1 1
My parents explain to me school topics in any
school subject.
0 0 1 1
My parents are aware of my grades. 0 0 1 1
My parents recommend me books that I have not
read yet.
0 0 1 1
My parents and I talk about how I am doing in
school.
0 0 1 1
My parents and I talk about my friends and what
we do together.
0 0 1 1
My parents and I talk about things that worry me. 0 0 1 1
My parents and I practice sports together. 0 0 1 1
My parents and I talk about radio and TV shows,
books or movies.
0 0 1 1
My parents and I talk about community, country
or world affairs.
0 0 1 1
My parents and I attend cultural activities toget-
her (festivals, parades, etc.).
0 0 1 1
My parents and I attend community activities. 0 0 1 1
My parents and I go to museums and expos in
galeries or in the street.
0 0 1 1
My parents and I go to the movies or theatre. 0 0 1 1
Notes: The first column shows each question in the index. Columns 2-5 show which values are
taken as 1 in the transformed variable. [1] Never [2] Sometimes [3] Frequently [4] Always. See
main text for details. Source: Own elaboration, based on 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro A.13: Components of “perception of own academic skills” index
Statement [1] [2] [3] [4]
I can understand any math-related topic. 0 0 1 1
When they teach us a new topic in math I can
learn it promptly.
0 0 1 1
I think I can understand hard topics in math. 0 0 1 1
When I take a math test, I am sure I will be able
to get the right answers.
0 0 1 1
I can help my classmates understand our math
homework.
0 0 1 1
I can do math homework without help. 0 0 1 1
I am confident I can pass math without trouble. 0 0 1 1
I am good solving math problems. 0 0 1 1
I feel more capable the more math I learn. 0 0 1 1
I feel I am good at math. 0 0 1 1
I feel confident studying what they teach me in
language skills.
0 0 1 1
I can answer correctly if asked about any topic in
language skills.
0 0 1 1
I am able to understand everything they teach us
in language skills.
0 0 1 1
I can solve individual homework of language
skills withough help.
0 0 1 1
I feel confident when I take a language skills test. 0 0 1 1
I can help my classmates with language skills ho-
mework they find difficult.
0 0 1 1
When I participate in language skills class I trust
I will do fine.
0 0 1 1
I have good performance in language skills. 0 0 1 1
It is easy for me to understand what I read. 0 0 1 1
I am confident I will pass language skills without
trouble.
0 0 1 1
Notes: The first column shows each question in the index. Columns 2-5 show which values are
taken as 1 in the transformed variable. [1] Never [2] Sometimes [3] Frequently [4] Always. See
main text for details. Source: Own elaboration, based on 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro A.14: Components of “Negative classroom environment” index
Statement [1] [2] [3] [4]
My teachers allow my classmates to be noisy du-
ring class.
0 0 1 1
My teachers solve class conflicts by talking th-
tough them.
1 1 0 0
My teachers let students misbehave. 0 0 1 1
My teachers explain to us the reasons why we
should behave.
1 1 0 0
My teachers yell at us when we misbehave. 0 0 1 1
My teachers encourage us to study. 1 1 0 0
My teachers give us additional help when we
need it.
1 1 0 0
My teachers congratulate us when we do a good
job.
1 1 0 0
My teachers care for our wellbeing. 1 1 0 0
My teachers make me feel bad when I make a
mistake.
0 0 1 1
My teachers listen carefully my opinions. 1 1 0 0
My teachers explain gently when I don’t unders-
tand something.
1 1 0 0
My teachers respect my opinions. 1 1 0 0
There is a bad relation between students and tea-
chers.
0 0 1 1
I have a good relation with my teachers. 1 1 0 0
My teachers critize me in front of my classmates
when I make mistakes.
0 0 1 1
In school we are encouraged to be friendly with
our peers.
1 1 0 0
I feel uncomfortable and out of place in school. 0 0 1 1
At school we are encouraged to respect our
peers.
1 1 0 0
When a student bullies someone, nobody speaks
up.
0 0 1 1
Notes: The first column shows each question in the index. Columns 2-5 show which values are
taken as 1 in the transformed variable. [1] Never [2] Sometimes [3] Frequently [4] Always. See
main text for details. Source: Own elaboration, based on 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Cuadro A.15: Ex-post power calculations
Rural Urban
Subject Threshold Effect Males Females Males Females
Math Remedial MDE 0.164 0.160 0.114 0.156
δˆ 0.175 0.033 0.006 0.001
Proficient MDE 0.205 0.272 0.205 0.244
δˆ 0.028 0.114 0.027 0.005
Language Remedial MDE 0.154 0.153 0.096 0.097
δˆ 0.028 0.001 0.003 0.035
Proficient MDE 0.401 0.441 0.192 0.177
δˆ 0.132 0.027 0.007 0.035
Notes: This table reports minimum detectable effects (MDE) from ex-post power calculations with
80% power and 95% confidence (Cattaneo, Titiunik, and Vazquez-Bare, 2019). The estimated
discontinuities (in absolute value) are reported for reference. Source: Own elaboration, based on
2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Rural Males Rural Females Urban Males Urban Females
3 nearest neighbors
province-level cluster
3 nearest neighbors + province-level cluster
δ
Notes: The figure presents estimates for δ1 in equation (1). The outcome variable is the standar-
dized test score in 8th grade. Bias-robust confidence intervals are calculated with three methods:
heteroskedasticity-robust covariance matrix with at least three nearest neighbors, clustered stan-
dard errors at the province level, and the combination of both. Source: Own elaboration, based on
2009 and 2015 ECE, Ministry of Education.
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SD. FDR q-value = 0.98.
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the score in second grade math. The vertical axis measures the
standardized overall score in eighth grade. Source: Own elaboration, based on 2009 and 2015
ECE, Ministry of Education.
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Notes: The horizontal axis measures the score in second grade math. The vertical line is the
threshold between “remedial” and “in transition”. Source: Own elaboration, based on 2009 ECE,
Ministry of Education.
